We do not often think of
ethics as a creative endeavor. As a branch of philosophy, ethics has had to
adhere closely to reasoned argument and to logical analysis, which we typically
see as counter to or at least different from the creative leaps of imagination
that characterize the arts, for example. That was not always the case. Ethics
and aesthetics once shared a close relationship, epitomized in the ancient idea
that truth (philosophy), beauty (aesthetics), and goodness (ethics) had an
inseparable relationship with each other.
The knot that tied them
together, however, slowly unraveled over the last two centuries. Truth
increasingly became the purview of the sciences, which demanded experimental
data to establish the truth of a situation or phenomena, rather than just the
reasoned arguments of philosophy. As a result of this, by the early 20th
century, philosophy, which had given birth to science, once called “natural
philosophy,” had begun to emulate and even imitate science, using mathematics
and logic to make a philosophical argument in much the same way that scientists
used these tools to assess experimental data.
Meanwhile, the link
between aesthetics and beauty came apart as well. Edmund Burke’s recognition of
the sublime, with its fascination with the terrifying or overwhelming, as the
complement to the balance and order of beauty as traditionally understood,
marks the beginning of that coming apart. Art over the 20th century
became increasingly obsessed with the sublime, to the point where beauty has
become a term almost never mentioned in aesthetic circles or said with a degree
of embarrassment.
Ethics followed suit with
its two classical companions. Nietzsche’s argument that claims of goodness
served as a cover for the will to power and G.E. Moore’s observation that the
good remained a simple un-analyzable object of thought represent just two of
many late 19th and early 20th century efforts to equate
ethics with subjective, intuitive, or emotive qualities that set it apart from
the increasingly objective, logical, and rational nature of modern philosophy.
Ethics became isolated,
not only from the mainstream of early 20th century philosophy, but
also from aesthetics. In other words, just as truth and goodness go through a
divorce – the facts of science, after all, are neither good nor bad – so too
did the relationship between beauty and goodness. This began with claims by 19th
century artists and critics who advocated “art for art’s sake,” and who sought
to protect aesthetics from moral analysis or from having to make a moral point.
The goodness of a work of art must rest upon its own aesthetic merits and not
upon some nostalgic or didactic attempt to depict “goodness.”
That sundering of truth,
beauty, and goodness underlay the scientism and abstraction of early 20th
century modernism, a period in which ethics seemed to go into a kind of
temporary eclipse. Morality became associated with 19th century
“Victorian” culture, while the “good” 20th century modernist faced
up to the unvarnished and even sometime terrifying facts of life, finding
comfort in the utilitarian functionalism of the machine age.
Late 20th
century Post-modernism represented, in some sense, the revenge of ethics. While
post-modernists questioned the actual objectivity of science and the covert
moralism of modern art and architecture, they also made ethics newly relevant
with the advent of feminist ethics, environmental ethics, bioethics, and applied
ethics of all sorts. Such post-modern ethics did not reverse the divorce of
truth, beauty, and goodness, but it did show how ethics offered a powerful way
of revealing and questioning the will to power that underlay a lot of modern
science, technology, and art.
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